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Abstract
This paper modifies Jaynes’s axioms of plausible reasoning and derives
the minimum relative entropy principle, Bayes’s rule, as well as maximum
likelihood from first principles. The new axioms, which I call the Opti-
mum Information Principle, is applicable whenever the decision maker is
given the data and the relevant background information. These axioms
provide an answer to the question “why maximize entropy when faced
with incomplete information?”
1 Introduction
Bayesian inference [1] and the maximum entropy principle (MaxEnt) of Jaynes
[9] are valid methods of inference when the decision maker is faced with incom-
plete information. Although these methodologies are quite distinct, they often
give similar results. A few authors have hinted at the possibility of deriving both
methods from first principles. For instance, as the sample size increases, [23]
showed that the distribution of a random variable conditional on empirical mo-
ment constraints (computed by Bayes’s rule) converges to the minimum relative
entropy distribution subject to the same population moment constraints. Con-
versely, [24] showed that Bayes’s rule can be derived from a variational principle
of information processing.
One possibility of deriving both the maximum entropy principle and Bayes’s
rule is to axiomatize plausible reasoning, as [14, 13, 3, 12] attempted. In the
most primitive form, Jaynes [12] suggested desiderata that should be employed
in plausible reasoning, by which he deduced Bayes’s rule. To apply Bayes’s rule
we have to start from some priors, and Jaynes advocates the use of the maximum
entropy principle to set up priors. However, there are many situations in which
both MaxEnt and Bayesian inference are applicable. Which method should we
take then? And do they return the same result? In this paper I propose a
different set of axioms of plausible reasoning, by which I derive the minimum
relative entropy principle1, Bayes’s rule, and maximum likelihood.
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I proceed in two steps. First, I list the desiderata of a measure of informa-
tion gain when a decision maker updates the plausibility of a proposition upon
receiving new information. From these desiderata I derive the functional form of
information gain. Second, I impose the decision maker to be maximally conser-
vative, given all the relevant information. That is, the decision maker updates
the plausibilities by minimizing the average information gain (i.e., sticks to his
or her prior as much as possible) subject to all relevant information, which I
call the Optimum Information Principle. I show that the Optimum Information
Principle implies the well-known minimum relative entropy principle, the Bayes
rule, and also Jaynes’s axioms.
2 Axioms of Plausible Reasoning
Viewing probability as the plausibility of a proposition dates back at least to
Keynes [14]. As Cox [3] describes it “as if Euclid had placed the Pythagorean
theorem among the axioms of plane geometry”, Keynes’s axioms were not fun-
damental, and have been improved by [13] and [3]. To date the most primitive
axioms of plausible reasoning seem to be those of Jaynes [12, pp. 17–19]:
J-I. Degrees of plausibility are represented by real numbers.
J-II. Qualitative correspondence with common sense.
J-III. Consistency.
(a) If a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, then
every possible way must lead to the same result.
(b) The robot2 always takes into account all of the evidence it has
relevant to a question. It does not arbitrarily ignore some of the
information, basing its conclusions only on what remains. In other
words, the robot is completely nonideological.
(c) The robot always represents equivalent states of knowledge by equiv-
alent plausibility assignments. That is, if in two problems the
robot’s state of knowledge is the same (except perhaps for the label-
ing of the propositions), then it must assign the same plausibilities
in both.
Desideratum II means the following. If we denote the plausibility of a proposi-
tion A given information I by p(A|I), then
p(A|C′) > p(A|C) =⇒ p(¬A|C′) < p(¬A|C), and (2.1)
p(A|C′) > p(A|C)
p(B|A ∧ C′) = p(B|A ∧ C)
}
=⇒ p(A ∧B|C′) ≥ p(A ∧B|C). (2.2)
In words, (2.1) says that if information C gets updated to C′ in such a way
that the plausibility of A is increased, then the plausibility of the negation of
A is decreased; (2.2) says that if, in addition, the plausibility of B given A is
unchanged, then the plausibility that both A and B are true must increase.
2The “robot” is a machine that performs plausible reasoning according to the desiderata.
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Chapter 2 of [12] shows that desiderata I–IIIb imply that plausibilities have a
probability representation and they obey Bayes’s rule, and that desideratum
IIIc implies Laplace’s Principle of Indifference [17] for setting up priors.
In order to derive MaxEnt and Bayes’s rule, I first axiomatize the quantity
which I call information gain and derive its functional form. The axioms, which
are all intuitively appealing, are as follows.
IG-1. Numerical representation: the information gain I is a function of prior
plausibility p and posterior plausibility q.
IG-2. Smootheness and monotonicity: the information gain is a smooth, in-
creasing function in posterior plausibility.
IG-3. Path independence: the total information gain of updating the prior plau-
sibility p to the posterior q is independent of the path it is updated.
That is, if there are two paths p → r → q and p → r′ → q, then
I(p, r) + I(r, q) = I(p, r′) + I(r′, q).
IG-4. Independence from the choice of unit: whatever unit we choose to describe
plausibility, the information gain should have the same value. That is,
I(tp, tq) = I(p, q) for t > 0.
IG-5. Zero information gain for not updating: for any p, we have I(p, p) = 0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that axioms IG-1–IG-5 hold. Then I(p, q) = k log q
p
,
where k > 0 is an arbitrary constant.
Proof. Since by axiom IG-2 the information gain I(p, q) is smooth in q, it is
partially differentiable with respect to q and I can be recovered by integrating
its partial derivative. Differentiating I(p, r) + I(r, q) = I(p, r′) + I(r′, q) with
respect to q, we get
∂I
∂q
(r, q) =
∂I
∂q
(r′, q). (2.3)
The left-hand side of (2.3) is a function of (r, q), and the right-hand side of (2.3)
is a function of (r′, q). Since r, r′ are arbitrary, (2.3) must be a function of only
q. Let ∂I
∂q
(r, q) = g(q). By integration we get I(r, q) = F (r) +G(q), where F is
some function and G =
∫
g. By the path independence axiom IG-3, we get
[F (p) +G(r)] + [F (r) +G(q)] =[F (p) +G(r′)] + [F (r′) +G(q)]
⇐⇒ F (r) +G(r) = F (r′) +G(r′). (2.4)
Since (2.4) holds for any r, r′, F (r) + G(r) is constant, but it must be zero by
axiom IG-5: F (r)+G(r) = I(r, r) = 0. Therefore I(p, q) = F (p)+G(q) = G(q)−
G(p). By axiom IG-4, we have G(tq) − G(tp) = G(q) − G(p). Differentiating
both sides with respect to q, we get tG′(tq) = G′(q). Multiplying both sides
by q and letting x = tq, we get xG′(x) = qG′(q), so the function xG′(x) is a
constant k. Integrating G′(x) = k/x yields G(x) = k log x + C, hence I(p, q) =
G(q) −G(p) = k log q
p
. Since I is increasing in q by axiom IG-2, we get k > 0.
Clearly this function satisfies all axioms IG-1–IG-5.
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From now on let us normalize the arbitrary constant k to 1, so the informa-
tion gain is given by I(p, q) = log q
p
. This result,
information gain = log
posterior plausibility
prior plausibility
,
is mathematically identical to [5, p. 4], although Goldman takes this as the
definition.3
In order to make plausible reasoning based on available information, consider
the following desiderata.
I. Degrees of plausibility are represented by probabilities.
II. The robot always takes into account all of the evidence it has relevant to a
question. It does not arbitrarily ignore some of the information, basing its
conclusions only on what remains. In other words, the robot is completely
nonideological.
III. Aristotelian logic: the robot assigns zero plausibility to propositions that
contradict its knowledge.
IV. The robot always represents equivalent states of knowledge by equivalent
plausibility assignments. That is, if in two problems the robot’s state of
knowledge is the same (except perhaps for the labeling of the propositions),
then it must assign the same plausibilities in both.
V. Given prior plausibilities, the robot updates the plausibilities by minimiz-
ing the average information gain of the posterior plausibilities subject to
known information. In other words, the robot is maximally conservative.
Desideratum I is stronger than Jaynes’s desideratum J-I because I assume
that the plausibility is a probability (i.e., finitely or countably additive measure).
In particular, the plausibilities of mutually exclusive propositions are additive:
if A,B are mutually exclusive propositions, then p(A ∨ B) = p(A) + p(B).
Desideratum II is identical to J-IIIb. Desideratum III might be interpreted as a
special case of II and probably needs no justification, but I need it nevertheless.
Desideratum IV is identical to J-IIIc, Laplace’s Principle of Indifference, which
may or may not be necessary to prove subsequent theorems.
Desideratum V is the major difference from Jaynes’s axioms. While Jaynes
imposes “qualitative correspondence with common sense” (J-II), I impose that
the robot is maximally conservative. This axiom makes sense, for if the robot
radically updates the plausibilities (i.e., not sticking to its prior), then it should
not have set up the particular prior plausibilities in the first place. To avoid
unnecessary reference to axiom numbers, let us group the desiderata as follows:
3In information theory the quantity − log p is known as the self-information, although I
was unable to find a reference for its origin (Tribus [21] calls it surprisal). Our information
gain I(p, q) = log q
p
is the difference of the self-information of the prior and posterior. Kullback
and Leibler [16] call log p1
p2
the information for discrimination, where p1, p2 are general prob-
abilities and not necessarily the prior and the posterior. The prior/posterior interpretation of
p and q can also be clearly seen in [7, 8].
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I–III: Weak Axioms of Plausible Reasoning
I–IV: Strong Axioms of Plausible Reasoning
IG-1–IG-5 and V: Minimum Information Gain Principle
3 Implications of the Axioms
In this section I show that the new axioms imply Bayesian inference, maximum
likelihood, maximum entropy principle, and minimum relative entropy principle.
Theorem 2. Weak plausibility and the minimum information gain principle
imply the minimum relative entropy principle (the minimum discrimination in-
formation principle of Kullback [15, p. 37]).
Proof. Let {Ai } be propositions that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Let pi = p(Ai|I) be the prior plausibility of proposition Ai given background
information I, and qi = p(Ai|I
′) be the posterior plausibility to be computed
given the new information I ′. By desideratum I, we have pi, qi ≥ 0 and
∑
pi =∑
qi = 1. Since by Proposition 1 the information gain of Ai is log
qi
pi
, the ex
post average information gain is
H(q; p) :=
n∑
i=1
qi log
qi
pi
,
the relative entropy.4 By desiderata II and V, the robot minimizes H(q; p)
subject to all known information I ′ and the constraints qi ≥ 0,
∑
qi = 1, which
is precisely the minimum relative entropy principle.
Corollary 3. Strong plausibility and the minimum information gain principle
imply the maximum entropy principle of Jaynes [9] for setting up priors.
Proof. Desideratum IV is nothing but Laplace’s Principle of Indifference. Hence,
by desideratum I, the robot assigns the prior plausibility p(Ai) =
1
n
. By Theo-
rem 2 the robot computes the posterior plausibility pi = p(Ai|I) by minimizing
n∑
i=1
pi log
pi
1/n
=
n∑
i=1
pi(log pi + logn) =
n∑
i=1
pi log pi + logn,
(where we have invoked desideratum I:
∑
pi = 1) or equivalently, maximiz-
ing Shannon’s entropy H(p) = −
∑n
i=1 pi log pi [19]. This is precisely Jaynes’s
maximum entropy principle [9].
I propose to define the Optimum Information Principle by the combination
of the weak or strong plausibility and the minimum information gain principle,
despite its implication is the well-known minimum relative entropy principle.
There are two reasons to avoid the term “entropy”. First, “entropy” is a mis-
nomer both in physics (see [2]) and in information theory. According to [22],
Shannon [19] named his measure of uncertainty or missing information “en-
tropy” following the advice of von Neumann: “[It] has been used in statistical
mechanics under that name . . . [and] no one knows what entropy really is, so in
4This quantity was first proposed by Kullback and Leibler [16], which they call, appropri-
ately, “information”.
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a debate you will always have the advantage.” Clausius coined the word “en-
tropy” after the Greek word for “transformation”; given that “entropy” is a
misnomer, adding the adjective “relative” makes it only worse. Second, as a
measure of information gain the Kullback-Leibler information H(q; p) is more
fundamental than the Shannon entropy H(p) as shown by the above axiomatic
derivation as well as the comparison of the two information measures provided
in [8]: the Kullback-Leibler information, unlike the Shannon entropy, extends to
arbitrary probability measures and it satisfies an additivity property. Since by
desideratum V the quantity H(q; p) is the average information gain, and since
Kullback and Leibler [16] call H(q; p) “information” before the term “relative
entropy” was coined, the term Optimum Information Principle seems best.5
Theorem 4. Weak plausibility and the minimum information gain principle
imply Jaynes’s desiderata I–IIIb, in particular Bayes’s rule. Therefore, the Op-
timum Information Principle is consistent with Bayesian inference.
Proof. Let us first prove Bayes’s rule. Suppose that the robot is given back-
ground information I and that the robot has prior plausibilities on the proposi-
tions A1, . . . , An, B, and any logical conjunction or negation generated by them.
Therefore the prior plausibilities of Ai ∧Aj , Ai ∧B, Ai ∧ (¬B), etc., which are
denoted by p(Ai ∩ Aj |I), p(Ai ∩ B|I), p(Ai ∩ B
c|I), etc., are well defined. The
task of the robot is to update the plausibilities of {Ai } when it is given ad-
ditional information B. Since there are only a finite number of propositions,
without loss of generality we may assume that {Ai } are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. By desideratum I, we have
∑n
i=1 p(Ai|I) = 1.
Let us denote the posterior plausibilities by q(Ai ∩ B|B ∩ I), etc. In order
to compute them, by Theorem 2 the robot solves
min
q
∑
q log
q
p
subject to (3.1a)
n∑
i=1
(q(Ai ∩B|B ∩ I) + q(Ai ∩B
c|B ∩ I)) = 1, (3.1b)
(∀i) q(Ai ∩B
c|B ∩ I) = 0, (3.1c)
where p, q in (3.1a) take all possible forms of p(Ai ∩B|I), q(Ai ∩B|B ∩ I) and
p(Ai∩B
c|I), q(Ai∩B
c|B∩I). Conditions (3.1b) and (3.1c) come from desiderata
I and III: since ¬B (and hence Ai∧(¬B)) is logically impossible knowing B, the
robot assigns zero plausibility to Ai ∧ (¬B). That we impose (3.1b) and (3.1c)
and nothing else comes from using all relevant information as in desideratum
II.
Since the function f(q) = q log q
p
is continuous and strictly convex and the
constraints (3.1b), (3.1c) constitute a compact convex set, we can apply the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem to solve (3.1). Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier
corresponding to (3.1b). The Lagrangian is
L(q, λ) =
n∑
i=1
qi log
qi
pi
+ λ
(
n∑
i=1
qi − 1
)
,
5[6] calls it the Maximum Information Principle, meaning that the missing information
is maximized. Maximizing the missing information is equivalent to minimizing the infor-
mation gain as we do here. The adjective “optimum” avoids the confusion between maxi-
mum/minimum.
6
where we have used the shorthand qi = q(Ai ∩B|B ∩ I) and pi = p(Ai ∩ B|I).
The first-order condition, which is necessary and sufficient, reads
∂L
∂qi
= log
qi
pi
+ 1 + λ = 0.
This shows that qi is proportional to pi, so by
∑
qi = 1 we obtain qi =
pi/
∑n
i=1 pi. Therefore,
q(Ai|B ∩ I) = q(Ai ∩B|B ∩ I) + q(Ai ∩B
c|B ∩ I)
= q(Ai ∩B|B ∩ I) = qi
=
p(Ai ∩B|I)∑n
i=1 p(Ai ∩B|I)
=
p(Ai ∩B|I)
p(B|I)
, (3.2)
where the first equality holds because q is a probability (desideratum I), the
second equality holds because q(Ai ∩B
c|B ∩ I) = 0 (desideratum III), and the
last equality holds because p is a probability and {Ai } are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive. (3.2) is precisely the Bayes rule.
Now let us show that Jaynes’s desiderata I–IIIb are implied. All we need
to show are desiderata II (conditions (2.1) and (2.2)) and IIIa. (2.1) holds
because plausibility has a probability representation by desideratum I. (2.2)
holds by Bayes’s rule, which we have already deduced in (3.2). Desideratum
IIIa holds by the Additivity Theorem of Hobson and Cheng [8, p. 308], where
they essentially show that if the robot has initial background information I0
that gets updated to I1 and then to I2, with plausibilities p0, p1, p2 respectively,
then
H(p2; p0) = H(p2; p1) +H(p1; p0),
that is, the (minimized) Kullback-Leibler information is additive.6 In particular,
if there are two ways to update, I0 → I1 → I2 and I0 → I
′
1
→ I2, then we obtain
H(p2; p1) +H(p1; p0) = H(p2; p
′
1) +H(p
′
1; p0), (3.3)
the path independence. Therefore Jaynes’s desideratum IIIa holds because if a
conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, the path independence
property (3.3) ensures that every possible way leads to the same result.
At this point I stress the distinction between our axiomatization and other
author’s. In his seminal work [19], Shannon imposes as the third axiom “If a
choice be broken down into two successive choices, the original H should be the
weighted sum of the individual values of H”, in which he implicitly uses Bayes’s
rule. The same remark applies to the axiomatization of the Kullback-Leibler
information by Hobson [7]. Similarly, in the important axiomatization of the
maximum entropy principle, Shore and Johnson [20] implicitly use Bayes’s rule
in their fourth axiom “Subset Independence: It should not matter whether one
treats an independent subset of system states in terms of a separate conditional
density or in terms of the full system density”. Zellner [24] derives Bayes’s
rule from an “information processing rule”, but it is not clear how it relates to
maximum entropy and his definition of information seems somewhat arbitrary.
6This property is mathematically equivalent to the “Subset Independence” axiom of Shore
and Johnson [20, p. 27].
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On the contrary, Cox [3] and Jaynes [12] derive the Bayes rule from intuitively
appealing first principles, as we have done. In addition we have derived the
maximum entropy principle and the minimum relative entropy principle.
Finally, let us show that the Optimum Information Principle implies maxi-
mum likelihood.
Theorem 5. The Optimum Information Principle implies the maximum like-
lihood principle of Fisher [4].7
Proof. Suppose that {Xn }
N
n=1 are independently and identically distributed
random variables with an unknown density f . Given the realizations { xn },
suppose that the statistician wishes to fit a parametric density f(x; θ) to f ,
where θ ∈ Θ is a parameter. Although prior and posterior distributions are
meaningless for a frequentist, it is natural to interpret that the model f(x; θ)
and the truth f correspond to the prior and posterior, respectively. Hence to
make an optimal inference the statistician should choose θ so as to minimize
the Kullback-Leibler information
H(f ; fθ) =
∫
f(x) log
f(x)
f(x; θ)
dx.
However, by the law of large numbers we obtain
H(f ; fθ) =
∫
f log f −
∫
f log fθ =
∫
f log f − Ef [log f(X ; θ)]
≈
∫
f log f −
1
N
N∑
n=1
log f(xn; θ),
so the statistician should maximize the log likelihood
∑N
n=1 log f(xn; θ).
4 Concluding Remarks
The maximum entropy principle has occasionally been criticized ad hoc as “Why
maximize entropy (or minimize relative entropy), why not other functions?”. An
inference method is valuable if and only if it is useful in analyzing real data,
and therefore an inference method requires no interpretation, and no justifica-
tion except practical usefulness. (Nevertheless the justification of the maximum
entropy principle has been provided [9, 10, 11, 20].) It is well-known that the
minimum relative entropy principle (maximum entropy principle) and Bayesian
inference are useful (see [18, 12] and the references therein). Therefore, since our
Optimum Information Principle implies the minimum relative entropy principle,
Bayes’s rule, as well as maximum likelihood, it should be equally useful. In addi-
tion we have axiomatized plausible reasoning and derived the maximum entropy
principle; hence we have answered the question “why maximize entropy?”
References
[1] Rev. Thomas Bayes. An essay toward solving a problem in the doctrine of
chances. Royal Society Philosophical Transactions, 53:370–418, 1763.
7Although maximum likelihood is attributed to Fisher, it was already used by Laplace and
Gauss a century before.
8
[2] Arieh Ben-Naim. A Farewell to Entropy: Statistical Thermodynamics
Based on Information. World Scientific, Hackensack, NJ, 2008.
[3] Richard T. Cox. Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. Amer-
ican Journal of Physics, 14(1):1–13, 1946.
[4] Ronald A. Fisher. On an absolute criterion for fitting frequency curves.
Messenger of Mathematics, 41:155–160, 1912.
[5] Stanford Goldman. Information Theory. Prentice & Hall, Upper Saddle
River, NJ, 1953.
[6] Hermann Haken. Synergetics: Introduction and Advanced Topics. Springer,
Berlin, 2004.
[7] Arthur Hobson. A new theorem of information theory. Journal of Statistical
Physics, 1(3):383–391, 1969.
[8] Arthur Hobson and Bin-Kang Cheng. A comparison of the Shannon and
Kullback information measures. Journal of Statistical Physics, 7(4):301–
310, 1973.
[9] Edwin T. Janyes. Information theory and statistical mechanics, I. Physical
Review, 106(4):620–630, 1957.
[10] Edwin T. Janyes. Prior probabilities. IEEE Transactions on Systems Sci-
ence and Cybernetics, SSC-4(3):227–241, 1968.
[11] Edwin T. Janyes. On the rationale of maximum-entropy methods. Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE, 70(9):939–952, 1982.
[12] Edwin T. Jaynes. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2003. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.
[13] Harold Jeffreys. Theory of Probability. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939.
[14] John Maynard Keynes. A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan, London,
1921.
[15] Solomon Kullback. Information Theory and Statistics. John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 1959.
[16] Solomon Kullback and Richard A. Leibler. On information and sufficiency.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 22(1):79–86, 1951.
[17] Pierre Simon Laplace. The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s. Courcier, Paris,
1812.
[18] Thomas J. Loredo. From Laplace to supernova SN 1987A: Bayesian in-
ference in astrophysics. In P. F. Fouge`re, editor, Maximum Entropy and
Bayesian Methods, pages 81–142. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands, 1990.
[19] Claude E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System
Technical Journal, 27:379–423, 623–656, 1948.
9
[20] John E. Shore and Rodney W. Johnson. Axiomatic derivation of the princi-
ple of maximum entropy and the principle of minimum cross-entropy. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, IT-26(1):26–37, 1980.
[21] Myron Tribus. Thermostatics and Thermodynamics : An Introduction to
Energy, Information and States of Matter, with Engineering Applications.
Van Nostrand, New York, 1961.
[22] Myron Tribus and Edward C. McIrvine. Energy and information. Scientific
American, 224(3):179–188, 1971.
[23] Jan M. Van Campenhout and Thomas M. Cover. Maximum entropy and
conditional probability. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-
27(4):483–489, 1981.
[24] Arnold Zellner. Optimal information processing and Bayes’s theorem.
American Statistician, 42(4):278–280, 1988.
10
